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choices are rationalizable in terms of stochastic orderings on the normalized
price space if and only if there exits a solution to a linear feasibility problem.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Bandyopadhyay,Dasgupta,andPattanaik(1999)(henceforthBDP)initiatedalineof
investigation in which they explord choice behavior of a consumer who chooses in
a stochastic fashion from different budget sets. In BDP (2002) this approach was ex-
tended by an interpretation of tuples of deterministic demand functions of different
consumers as a stochastic demand function. They define a weak axiom of stochastic
revealed preference which is implied by but does not imply rationalizability in terms
of stochastic orderings on the commodity space.1 In BDP (2004), the authors note
that
i ti sn o ta ta l lo b v i o u sw h a tw o u l db ean a t u r a ls t o c h a s t i ct r a n s l a t i o no f
the familiar strong axiom of revealed preference and what would be the
implications of such a ‘strong axiom of stochastic revealed preference’.
It is the purpose of this paper to explore rationalizability issues, provide a necessary
and sufficient condition for rationalizability in terms of stochastic orderings, and to
discuss related problems.
Supposeaconsumerspecifiesaprobabilityforeachsubsetofagivenbudgetsuch
that the probability assignments add up to unity. Suppose further that we observe
these probability assignments on a finite set of budgets. Can we find conditions on
the probability assignments such that, if these conditions are satisfied, we cannot
reject the hypothesis that the consumer has random preference orderings and, given
the budget set, optimizes on the basis of his realized preference ordering?
Alternatively,supposeweobservesinglechoicesofmanyanonymousconsumers
on a finite set of budgets, such that we observe each individual decision but do not
know by which consumer the decision was made. Can we find conditions on the
choices such that, if these conditions are satisfied, we cannot reject the hypothesis
that the choices were made by a set of maximizing consumers?
The problem is complicated by at least two factors. Firstly, in the context of
stochastic revealed preference, budget sets are infinite sets of alternatives. The
1Formal definitions are given in Section 2.Stochastic Revealed Preference and Rationalizability 5
stochastic choice literature is usually confined to choices from finite sets.2 Secondly,
even in the deterministic case we are not in general able to recover the entire rank-
ing of a consumer with only a finite set of observations. This is simply because a
consumer might choose a in a situation where b is not available, and chooses b in
a situation where a is not available. If there are no further observations which can
be used to deduce a relation between a and b via a chain of other choices, we do not
k n o wi ft h ec o n s u m e rp r e f e r sa over b.I nt h es t o c h a s t i cc a s ew ea r et h e r e f o r eo n l y
abletodeduceminimalchoiceprobabilities;forexample,wemightbeabletodeduce
that the consumer prefers a over b in at least 30% of all cases and b over a in at least
20% of all cases.
It will be argued that a useful way to understand and analyze stochastic choices
onstandardbudgetsetsisintermsofindirectpreferencesontheprice-incomespace
or the normalized price space. To this end Sakai’s (Sakai, 1977) conditions for indi-
rect preferences from which a utility function can be deduced are used. That is, the
problemoffindingaprobabilitymeasureonorderingsovertheavailablecommodity
bundles is transformed into the problem of finding a probability measure on order-
ings over the budgets on which choices are observed.
Itisalsoshownthattherationalizabilityproblembearssimilaritiestotheproblem
of finding necessary and sufficient conditions for rationalizability of binary choice
probabilities; this is specifically true for stochastic revealed preference conditions




the choice probabilities that are sufficient for rationalizability regardless of the num-
ber of alternatives must be infinite. This poses some problems for the framework
considered here.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the no-
tation, and recalls the relevant work by BDP and Sakai. Section 3 introduced a linear
2Falmagne (1978), who was the first to find conditions for rationalizability of stochastic choices
by a probability distribution over linear preference orderings, explicitly confines himself to choices
from finite sets of alternatives. Cohen (1980) extends Falmagne’s approach to the case of an infinite
overall set of alternatives, but again, all choice sets are finite subsets of the set of alternatives.Stochastic Revealed Preference and Rationalizability 6
feasibility problem which is solvable if and only if the choices are rationalizable in
terms of stochastic orderings on the normalized price space. Combined with the
weak axiom of stochastic revealed preference it implies the existence of probability
distribution of orderings on the commodity space. Problems, in particular with con-
nection to binary choices, are discussed. Section 4 concludes.
2 Preparations
2.1 Notation and Basic Concepts
Let ℓ be the number of commodities, and let X = Rℓ
+ be the commodity space.3 The
normalized price space P is defined by
P = {p ∶ p =(p1, p2,...,pℓ) and pi = ρi/w (i = 1,2,...,ℓ)
for some (ρ1,ρ2,...,ρℓ,w)∈Rℓ
++ ×R++},
where ρi denotes the price of commodity i and w denotes the consumer’s income;
for most of the paper we shall assume that we observe consumption decisions on a
finite set of n budgets. A budget set can then be defined by {x ∈ X ∶ px ≤ 1}. We will
denote the budget sets as Bi = B(pi) and the upper bound of budget sets as ¯ Bi =
{x ∈ X ∶ pixi = 1}, where superscripts index the observation. Furthermore B ⊆ 2X
denotes the family of all budget sets, i.e. B = ⋃{B(p)∶p ∈ P}.
Let h be a nonempty demand correspondence (function) on B which assigns to
each B an o n e m p t ys u b s e th(B). For most of the paper, we shall assume that h is a
singleton, and denote xi =( xi
1,xi
2,...,xi
ℓ)=h(Bi). Furthermore we shall assume
t h a tt h ee n t i r ei n c o m ei ss p e n t ,s u c ht h a th(Bi)=h(¯ Bi).
Let R ⊆ X × X be a binary relation on X.I fpixi ≥ pix then {xi,x}∈R and we
s a yt h a tt h eo b s e r v a t i o nxi is directly revealed preferred to x. For brevity, we write
xiRx. The observation xi is revealed preferred to x,w r i t t e nxiR∗x,i fe i t h e rxiRx or
for some sequence of bundles (xj,xk,...,xm) it is the case that xiRxj, xjRxk,...,
3Notation: Rℓ
+ ={ x ∈ Rℓ ∶ x ≧ 0}, Rℓ
++ ={ x ∈ Rℓ ∶ x > 0},w h e r e“x ≧ y ”m e a n s“xi ≥ yi for
all i ”, and x ≠ y ”, and “ x > y ”m e a n s“xi > yi for all i ”. Note the convention to use subscripts to
denote scalars or vector components and superscripts to index bundles.Stochastic Revealed Preference and Rationalizability 7
xmRx.I nt h i sc a s eR∗ is the transitive closure of the relation R, i.e. R∗ = ⋃i Ri.L e t
R be the set of all orderings over X.4
The weak axiom of revealed preference (warp) asserts that R is asymmetric: For
all x,x′ ∈ X, x ≠ x′, xRx′ implies ¬(x′Rx),w h e r e¬ means “not true”. The strong
axiom of revealed preference (sarp) asserts that the transitive closure of R, R∗,i s
asymmetric: xR∗x′ implies ¬(x′R∗x).
2.2 Indirect Revealed Preference and Revealed Favorability
Th e r ei san o t i o no findirect revealed preference due to Sakai (1977), Little (1979), and
Richter (1979).5 We will rely on Sakai’s definitions and use the concept of revealed
favorability inthefollowingsense: LetF ⊆ B×Bbeab ina ryr ela tio no nB.I fxj ∈ Bi
then there has to be an element x ∈ Bi w h i c hi sa tl e a s ta sg ooda sxj,a n dw es a yt h a t
budget Bi is revealed more favorable than budget Bj. Given a set of observations on
a consumer, we define the relation F1 as Bi F1 Bj if xj ∈ Bi and Bi ≠ Bj.L e tF be the
transitive closure of the relation F1.L e tF be the set of all orderings on B.
The weak axiom of revealed favorability (warf) asserts that F1 is asymmetric:
For all B,B′ ∈ B, BF1 B′ implies ¬(B′F1 B).Th estrong axiom of revealed favorabi-
lity (sarf) asserts that the transitive closure of F1, F, is asymmetric: BFB′ implies
¬(B′FB).
2.3 Stochastic Revealed Preference and its Weak Axiom
Next we recall the relevant part of the concepts used by BDP (1999, 2004).
Astochasticdemandfunction(sdf)isarule д,which,foreverynormalizedprice
vector p ∈ P specifies exactly one probability measure q over the class of all subsets
of the budget set B = B(p).L e tq = д(p),w h e r eд is an sdf, and let A b eas u b s e t
4We use the term “ordering” in the same sense as BDP. An ordering over Rℓ
+ isbinaryrelation R
over Rℓ
+ satisfying: (i) reflexivity: for all x ∈ Rℓ
+, xRx; (ii) connectedness: for all distinct x, y ∈ Rℓ
+,
xRyor yRx; and (iii) transitivity: for all x, y,z ∈ Rℓ
+, [xRyand yRz] implies xRz.
5Sakai (1977) calls the relations on the price-income space revealed favorability relations and de-
fines weak and strong axioms of revealed favorability by analogy with warp and sarp. Little (1979)
calls his relations indirect preference relations and employs the Congruence Axiom due to Richter
(1966). See also Varian (1982), who explores the possibilities of ordinal comparisons between bud-
gets in empirical analysis.Stochastic Revealed Preference and Rationalizability 8
of a budget set B(p).Th e nq(A) i st h ep r o b a b i l i t yt h a tt h eb u n d l ec h o s e nb yt h e
consumer from the budget set B(p) will be in the set A.
Astochasticdemandfunction д isdegenerateifandonlyif, foreverynormalized
price vector p ∈ P, there exists x ∈ B(p) such that, for every subset A of B(p), x ∈ A
implies q(A)=1a n dx ∉ Aimplies q(A)=0, where q = д(p).
A stochastic demand function д satisfies the weak axiom of stochastic revealed
preference (wasrp) if and only if, for all pairs of normalized price vectors p and p′,
and for all A ⊆ B∩B′
q(B−B′) ≥ q′(A)−q(A), (1)
where q = д(p), q′ = д(p′), B = B(p) and B′ = B(p′).
Astochasticdemandfunctionwhichsatisfiesq(¯ B)=1iscalledtight (Bandyopad-
hyay et al., 2004). The analysis here is confined to tight demand.
A stochastic demand function д satisfies rationalizability in terms of stochastic
orderings (rso) if and only if there exists a probability measure r defined on R such
that, for every normalized price vector p and every subset Aof B = B(p)
q(A)=r[{R ∈ R ∶ there is a unique R−greatest element in B
a n dt h a te l e m e n ti si nA}] (2)
where q = д(p). BDP (1999) show that rso implies but is not implied by wasrp.
2.4 Indirect Preferences and Stochastic Choice
To extend wasrp to a stronger condition analogous to sarp it seems necessary to
be able to utilize transitive closures of preference relations. But when we observe
probability measures over all subsets of given budgets it is difficult to interpret these
measures in terms of preference relations between elements of X.I ti sm o r eo b v i o u s
howtointerprettheobservationsintermsofindirectpreferencerelationsorrevealed
favorability relations between elements of B: We can interpret qj(Bj ∩ Bi) as the
minimal share of the consumer’s indirect preference relations which rank budget Bi











Figure 1: An example
Consider Figure 1. Suppose on budget B the consumer assigns the probabilities
q(A1)=6⁄8 and q(A2)=2⁄8 tothesetsA1andA2respectively. OnbudgetB′heassigns
the probabilities q′(A′
1)=4⁄8 and q′(A′
2)=4⁄8. Clearly he reveals that at least 2⁄8 of
his preference orderings rank B′ over B, and at least 4⁄8 of his preference orderings
rank B oder B′.
Now suppose the indicated subsets of the budgets are singletons. The observed
probability assignments are consistent with a consumer who has three different pref-
erences Ra, Rb, Rc, such that A1 is the Ra-greatest element of B and A′
2 is the Ra-
greatest element of B′ and the preference Ra is realized with probability 4⁄8; A1 is the
Rb-greatest element of B and A′
1 is the Rb-greatest element of B′ and the preference
Rb is realized with probability 2⁄8; A2 is the Rc-greatest element of B and A′
1 is the
Rc-greatest element of B′ and the preference Rc is realized with probability 2⁄8.
When considering indirect preferences, the only conditions imposed by the ob-
served probability assignments are that the consumer has an indirect preference
which ranks budget B over B′ and is realized with a probability of at least 4⁄8, and an
indirect preference which ranks budget B′ over B and is realized with a probability
of at least 2⁄8. For example the consumer could have two different indirect prefer-Stochastic Revealed Preference and Rationalizability 10
ences Fa and Fb, such that B is the Fa-greatest element of {B,B′} and the preference
Fa is realized with probability 5⁄8; B′ is the Fb-greatest element of {B,B′} and the
preference Fb is realized with probability 3⁄8.
3 Rationalizability
3.1 Rationalizability in Terms of Stochastic Orderings on the Normal-
ized Price Space
We say that a stochastic demand function д satisfies rationalizability in terms of
s t o c h a s t i co r d e r i n g so nt h en o r m a l i z e dp r i c es p a c e(rsop) if and only if there exists a
probabilitymeasure f definedonF suchthatthisassignmentoverpreferencescould
have generated the observed stochastic choices. That is, we can use f to generate the
observed stochastic demand: For budgets B1,B2,...,Bm
f [{F ∈ F ∶{ Bi}m−1





i.e. the sum over all indirect preferences which rank all budgets in {Bi}m−1
i=1 higher
than Bm i sg r e a t e rt h a no re q u a lt ot h ec h o i c ep r o b a b i l i t ya s s i g n e dt ot h ep a r to fBm
that intersects with all {Bi}m−1
i=1 . Furthermore,
f [{F ∈ F ∶ Bm F{Bi}m−1





i.e. the sum over all indirect preferences which rank all budgets in {Bi}m−1
i=1 lower
than Bm is less than or equal to the choice probability assigned to the part of Bm that
does not intersects with any Bi in {Bi}m−1
i=1 .
Because the number of different indirect preferences is finite if the number of
observations is finite, it is straightforward to test, at least in principle, for rsop. Let
N ={ 1,2,...,n} be the set of indices of the observed budgets. Let S(N)bethesetof
all ordered n-tuples of indices in N,i . e .t h es e to ft h eη = n! permutations of N.Th e
elements of S(N) will be indicated by σ, and more explicitly as σi = ⟨a,b,...,e⟩ andStochastic Revealed Preference and Rationalizability 11
σi(1)=a, σi(2)=b,e t c .L e tπi = π(σi) be the probability assigned to the ordering
σi.
We now define the following linear feasibility problem:
find Π =( π1,π2,...,πη) (fp.1)




πi = 1 (fp.3)
∑
{i∶σi(j)<σi(k)∀j∈M}
















for all 1 ≤ i ≤ η and all nonempty M ⊂ N and all k ∈ N,k ∉ M
Notethat∑{i∶σi(j)<σi(k)∀j∈M} πi denotesthesumoverallprobabilityassignments
over preferences which rank all j ∈ M higher than k, excluding preferences which
r a n ko n eo rm o r ej ∈ M lower than k.
Theorem 1 The following conditions are equivalent:
(1) there exists a probability measure f over the set of all orderings on B that
rationalizes the stochastic choices {q(Bi)}
n
i=1;
(2) the linear feasibility problem (fp) has a solution.
Proof. Follows immediately from the definition of rsop. Note that the theorem
bears similarities to Block and Marschak (Block and Marschak, 1960, Theorem 3.1).
3.2 Rationalizability in Terms of Stochastic Orderings on the Commod-
ity Space
Sakai (Sakai, 1977, Theorem 6) shows that if the entire income is spent, the (deter-
ministic) demand at every normalized price vector is a singleton, and the demandStochastic Revealed Preference and Rationalizability 12
function satisfies sarp, then a (direct) utility function can be deduced from the fa-
vorability relation.Because warp implies single valued demand, sarf and warp
together imply the existence of a utility function that rationalizes the demand. So it
is not surprising that analogously the existence of a solution to (fp) and satisfaction
of wasrp imply rso:
Theorem 2 The stochastic demand function д satisfies rationalizabilityin terms
of stochastic orderings (on the commodity space) if the linear feasibility problem
(fp) has a solution and the weak axiom of stochastic revealed preference is satisfied.
Proof. Identify a deterministic demand function h with a degenerate stochastic de-
mand function. Under warp and sarf, xRx′ if and only if BFB′,w h e r ex = h(B)
and x′ = h(B′). By virtue of Sakai’s (Sakai, 1977) Theorem 5, there exists a function
v ∶ B → R such that BFB′ implies v(B)>v(B′).W h e nh is a one-to-one corre-
spondence, we can define a function λ ∶ X → B such that λ(x)=h−1(x). Then there
exists a function u ∶ X → R such that u(x)=v(λ[x]) > v(λ[x′]) = u(x′),s ou
rationalizes R (Sakai (Sakai, 1977, Theorem 6)).
In the stochastic case rsop implies that there exist functions vF ∶ B → R such
that BFB′ implies vF(B)>vF(B′), for all F with f(F)>0. Define a set of functions
дR ∶ B → X for R ∈ R such that дR(B)={ x ∈ X ∶ x is the R−greatest element in B}.
Note that wasrp implies that each дR(⋅) is uniquely invertible. This is because for
two budgets B = B′, wasrp excludes q(A)≠q′(A) for all A ⊆ B,B′.
Then under wasrp and rsop, for every indirect preference preference F there
are direct preferences R such that xRx ′ if and only if BFB′,w h e r ex = дR(B) and
x′ = дR(B′). Define a set of functions µR ∶ X → B such that µR(x)=д−1
R (x).
Then in analogy to Sakai’s Theorem there exist functions uR ∶ X → R such that
uR (дR[B]) = vF(µR[дR(B)]) > vF(µR[д′
R(B′)]) = uR (д′
R[B′]).Stochastic Revealed Preference and Rationalizability 13
3.3 Problems and Open Questions
Considerthefollowingconstruction: AbudgetBi isrevealedmorefavorablebydegree
















where the maximum is over all sets of indices M ⊆ N −{i, j}. Then obviously
φ(i, j)+φ(j,i)≤1 (4)
isanecessa ryco ndi tio nf o rrsop.I tma yseemtobear easo nableco n ject ur etha tthe
condition is also sufficient, but unfortunately it is not, as will be shown below. But
first note the following:
Claim 1 Identify a deterministic demand function with a degenerate stochastic
demandfunction. Forthatdemandfunction,condition(4)isequivalenttothestrong
axiom of revealed favorability.
Proof. In the deterministic case, Bi FBj is equivalent to φ(i, j)=1. To see this,
note that (i) φ(i, j)∈{ 0,1}, (ii) Bi F1 Bj is equivalent to qj(Bj ∩Bi) = 1, and
(iii) Bi FBj is equivalent to qj(Bj ∩BM(1)) = 1, qM(1)(BM(1) ∩BM(2)) = 1, ...,
qM(m)(BM(m) ∩BM(i)) = 1f o rso m eM ⊂ N. So condition (4) is equivalent to asym-
metry of F.
A “system of binary probabilities” [αij∶ i, j ∈{ 1,2,...,n},i ≠ j,αij+αji = 1] is
said to be “induced by rankings” (rationalizable) if there is a probability distribu-
tion on the set of n! orderings of {1,2,...,n} such that, for all distinct i and j, αijis
the sum of all probabilities attached to orderings which rank i over j (cf. FishburnStochastic Revealed Preference and Rationalizability 14
(1990)). The so-called triangular condition
αij+αjk +αki ≤ 2 (5)
and its generalization
αM(1)M(2) +αM(2)M(3) +...+αM(m)M(1) ≤ m−1( 6)
forallsetsofindicesM ⊆ N oflengthmisanecessaryconditionforrationalizability.6
It was also conjectured to be a sufficient condition for rationalizability by Marschak
(1959). Inanunpublishedpaper,McFaddenandRichter(1970)providedacounterex-
ample for n = 6.7 Later on, Fishburn (1990) observed that the set of conditions on
thechoiceprobabilitiesthataresufficientforrationalizabilityregardlessof n must be
infinite.
Thisposessomeproblemsfortheframeworkconsideredhere. Considerthecoun-
terexample of McFadden and Richter (1970) applied to the framework of stochastic
revealed preference: For n = 6, let
α12 = α14 = α34 = α36 = α56 = α52 = 1
α21 = α41 = α43 = α63 = α65 = α25 = 0
αij= 1/2 for all other i, j
where qj(Bj ∩Bi) = αij. Then the triangular condition and its generalization are
satisfied,andsoiscondition(4);but(fp)hasnosolution. Indeed,withqj(Bj ∩Bi) =
αij, conditions (6) implies (4) because
φ(i, j)+φ(j,i)=αjMi(1) +αMi(1)Mi(2) +...+αMi(m)i
+αiMj(1) +αM j(1)M j(2) +...+αM j(m) j (7)
−mi −mj,
6For the generalized form, see for example Cohen and Falmagne (1990). In the case of binary
probabilities, the generalized form can be deduced from the triangular condition.
7A revision of the paper was later published as McFadden (2005).Stochastic Revealed Preference and Rationalizability 15
where Mi and Mj, ∣Mi∣=mi and ∣Mj∣=mj, are the sets of indices used to construct
φ(i, j) and φ(j,i),a n dw i t h( 7 )a n dc o n d i t i o n( 6)w eo b t a i n
φ(i, j)+φ(j,i)+mi +mj ≤( mi +1)+(mj +1)−1
⇔ φ(i, j)+φ(j,i)≤1.
Whileitmightalsobepossiblethatexploitationoftheparticularitiesoftheframe-
work of BDP, e.g. linearities of budgets, helps to find finite sets of necessary and
sufficient conditions for stochastic revealed preference without applicability to the
binary probability problem8,t h er e s u l t so ft h i ss e c t i o ns u g g e s tt h a tc o n d i t i o n sf o r
rsopbasedondefinitionsforapartialrevealedfavorabilityrelationbetweenbudgets
suffer from similar problems as the conditions for rationalizability of binary proba-
bilities. Therefore a “strong axiom of stochastic revealed favorability” could possibly
also solve the problem of finding a finite set of necessary and sufficient conditions
for systems of binary probabilities for each particular n.
4 Conclusion
The weak axiom of stochastic revealed preference, as introduced by Bandyopadhyay
et al. (1999), is a necessary but not sufficient condition for stochastic demand behav-
ior to be rationalizable in terms of stochastic orderings on the commodity space. It
wasthepurposeofthispapertoexplorerationalizabilityissuesandtoshowhowone
can, in principle, test whether or not a finite set of observations of stochastic choice
is rationalizable by stochastic orderings.
To this end the problem of finding a probability measure over orderings on the
commodity space was transformed into a problem of finding a probability measure
over orderings on the normalized price space. The advantage of this indirect ap-
proach is that it avoids the problems resulting from the infinity of the set of alter-
natives a consumer chooses from when facing a budget set defined in the usual way.
8Suppose the commodity space is restricted to the positive orthant of the two-dimensional Eu-
clideanspace. Then,inanalogytodeterministicrevealedpreference(seeRose(1958),Heufer(2007)),
wasrp might imply rso.Stochastic Revealed Preference and Rationalizability 16
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that rationalizability in terms of stochastic or-
derings on the normalized price space and the weak axiom of stochastic revealed
preference together imply rationalizability in terms of stochastic orderings on the
commodity space.
In Section 3.3 similarities with binary probability systems were pointed out. In
particular it was shown that conditions based on partial revealed favorability rela-
tions are likely to suffer from similar problems as the conditions for rationalizability
of binary probabilities.Stochastic Revealed Preference and Rationalizability 17
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